Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 53, Issue 3 (Summer 2016)

Article 12

Book Note: What’s Wrong With Copying?, by
Abraham Drassinower
James A. Hayes

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Book Note

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
Hayes, James A.. "Book Note: What’s Wrong With Copying?, by Abraham Drassinower." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 53.3 (2016) :
1101-1103.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol53/iss3/12

This Book Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode
Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Book Note: What’s Wrong With Copying?, by Abraham Drassinower
Abstract

“IN THE WORLD OF COPYRIGHT, an author is no sovereign despot in an inverted world of commodities.
She is rather a citizen among others in the great Republic of Letters.”2 Abraham Drassinower thus concludes
What’s Wrong With Copying? with an eloquent expression of its thesis. In this provocative book, Drassinower
critiques fundamental copyright theory and posits a move to an inclusive philosophy that compensates for
increasingly blurred lines between authors and publics. Drassinower argues for the construction of authors as
speakers, works of authorship as instances of communication, audiences as interlocutors, and the public
domain as a set of conditions underlying the equity of authors and users.3 Drassinower attempts to treat
copyright on its own terms, championing a rights-based vision of copyright substantiated across six chapters.
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Book Note

What’s Wrong With Copying?, by Abraham
Drassinower1
JAMES A. HAYES
“IN THE WORLD OF COPYRIGHT, an author is no sovereign despot in an inverted

world of commodities. She is rather a citizen among others in the great
Republic of Letters.”2 Abraham Drassinower thus concludes What’s Wrong With
Copying? with an eloquent expression of its thesis. In this provocative book,
Drassinower critiques fundamental copyright theory and posits a move to an
inclusive philosophy that compensates for increasingly blurred lines between
authors and publics.
Drassinower argues for the construction of authors as speakers, works of
authorship as instances of communication, audiences as interlocutors, and
the public domain as a set of conditions underlying the equity of authors and
users.3 Drassinower attempts to treat copyright on its own terms, championing a
rights-based vision of copyright substantiated across six chapters.
In chapter one, Drassinower examines a jurisprudential trend away from
a standard of originality that emphasizes authors’ diligence to one that instead
favours a work’s creativity. He argues that the creativity standard cannot be
sustained through a focus on the production of value. Works requiring significant
diligence could have great value but minimal creativity. The transition to the
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creativity standard therefore requires an alternative conception of copyright—
a conception of copyright as speech.4
Chapter two proposes that a better metaphor to guide copyright interpretation
is “dialogue” between authors and publics rather than the “balance” of authorial
incentives and the public interest.5 The chapter renders “fair use” and the
public domain as conditions of the audience’s entitlement to participate in an
ongoing conversation by, for example, criticizing a work or citing it as part of an
academic exercise.6
Chapter three tackles the status of unauthorized use in the absence of
authorship. Drassinower proposes that infringement requires re-communication.
Mere “ink on a page,”7 he argues, is not the purview of copyright law. To employ
a copy for personal purposes is therefore not a question of using the work fairly
or in a way that infringes. Personal use is “nonuse.”8
What is it about speaking in one’s own words that entitles the speaker to
prevent others from repeating them? The prevailing attitude is that entitlement
flows from authors’ right to protect their investment of time and effort. Chapter
four suggests that infringement is instead a wrong to the author’s autonomy as a
speaking being.9 “Copyright infringement,” Drassinower writes, “is ventriloquism
practiced on an unwilling subject.”10
Chapter five addresses the counterargument that an instrumentalist account
of copyright is superior because it provides a stronger foundation for the public
domain. Drassinower responds thusly: that an instrumentalist view of the public
domain is unstable because it is posited as a contingent calculation of its efficiency,
and that rights-based thinking is superior because it advances the public domain
as a matter of inherent dignity.11
The book’s final chapter locates copyright within a broader system of rights,
asking if plaintiffs’ claims are superseded by defendants’ freedom of expression.12
Examining miscellaneous exceptions to copyright, Drassinower proposes that
the only “exceptions properly so-called”13 arise where the investigation of the
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jurisprudential system requires that an author’s copyright give way in certain
circumstances to an interest or principle other than authorship.
Throughout What’s Wrong With Copying?, Drassinower voices concern about
the common idea that copying is legally or morally wrongful. Such a view,
he argues, “chafes against the palpitations of a digital world.”14 The problem is
deeper: learning proceeds through copying. Culture is predicated on copying.15
The implications of copyright expansion are therefore enormous. Drassinower
is not sceptical; he believes in the importance of copyright. Drassinower is
not idealistic; his critique is grounded in practicality. Copyright, he argues,
is a relationship that includes both the right of the author to speak and the right
of the audience to use those words to inform further dialogue.

14. Ibid at 1.
15. Ibid.

